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The Value of the Past Challenged. Myth and Ancient History in the Attic Orators 
 
 
I. THE VALUE OF THE DISTANT PAST 
 
‘History is bunk. What difference does it make how many times the 
ancient Greeks flew their kites?’ pronounced Henry Ford.1 Fortunately, not 
everybody subscribes to the apodictic comments on life that American 
entrepreneurs sometimes make, but Ford’s disavowal of history, in particular of 
ancient history, is representative of a general feeling. The past, many 
contemporaries would agree, is not of much help concerning the problems of the 
present. As Koselleck demonstrated, the topos of historia magistra vitae has lost 
much of its plausibility since 1800.
2
 The Greeks, it seems, thought differently. 
They were, as van Groningen aptly put it, in the ‘grip of the past’.3 Particularly the 
distant past was in high regard. To take an example from the Iliad, Phoenix 
adduces the story of Meleager when he tries to persuade Achilles to return to the 
battlefield: ‘For I remember this action of old, it is not a new thing, / and how it 
went; you are all my friends, I will tell it among you.’ (‘μέμνημαι τόδε ἔργον 
ἐγὼ πάλαι, οὔ τι νέον γε, / ὡς ἦν, ἐν δ᾽ ὑμῖν ἐρέω πάντεσσι φίλοισιν.’ 9.527-
8). A look at epic genealogy reveals that Meleager is only one generation older 
than the heroes of the Trojan War.
4
 Nonetheless, Phoenix qualifies Meleager’s 
refusal to defend Calydon as ‘of old time’. Whilst Ford evokes the ancient Greeks 
to debunk history, Phoenix’ presentation of the Meleager story implies that 
temporal distance heightens the authority of exempla.  
This view of the past is not only shared by other Homeric heroes, but also 
seems to apply to the ancient recipients of the Iliad. The prominence of epic 
poetry as well as the preference for mythic subjects in tragedy indicates that it was 
in particular the remote past that held the Greeks in a firm grip. This predilection 
for ancient times comes to the fore in the tendency to cast recent history in a 
mythic register.
5
 Aeschylus’ Persians and Simonides’ Plataea elegy, for instance, 
mythicize the Persian Wars just as Phoenix distances a recent event from the 
present. 
Two passages, one from Herodotus, the other from Thucydides, however, 
help muddle this picture of a uniform veneration of the ancient past. In Herodotus’ 
report on the battle at Plataea, the Athenians and Tegeans engage in a discussion 
about who is entitled to take the left wing (9.26-7).
6
 The Tegeans buttress their 
claim by invoking the duel in which their mythical king Echemus defeated Hyllus. 
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The Athenians start their response with a catalogue of mythical deeds, notably the 
intervention on behalf of the Heraclidae and the Argives around Adrastus, the 
victory over the Amazons and the participation in the Trojan War. All these 
achievements, however, should not count for much (9.27.4-5):  
 
But what is the point in mentioning these episodes? People who were 
brave in those days might be relatively useless now, and vice versa. So 
that’s enough ancient history. 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γάρ τι προέχει τούτων ἐπιμεμνῆσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἂν χρηστοὶ 
τότε ἐόντες ὡυτοὶ νῦν ἂν εἶεν φλαυρότεροι καὶ τότε ἐόντες φλαῦροι 
νῦν ἂν εἶεν ἀμείνονες. παλαιῶν μέν νυν ἔργων ἅλις ἔστω.  
 
Instead, the Athenians flag a recent display of their virtue: Marathon. 
While the Athenians here still dutifully list their mythical deeds, Thucydides has 
them discard the ancient past more harshly at a conference in Sparta in 432 BCE: 
‘Now as for the remote past, what need is there to speak when the audience would 
have the evidence of hearsay accounts rather than personal experience?’ (‘Καὶ τὰ 
μὲν πάνυ παλαιὰ τί δεῖ λέγειν, ὧν ἀκοαὶ μᾶλλον λόγων μάρτυρες ἢ ὄψις 
τῶν ἀκουσομένων;’ 1.73.2). 
In both cases, it has been suggested that the Athenians’ comments on the 
past reflect the author’s attitude.7 The observation that ‘people who were brave in 
those days might be relatively useless now, and vice versa’ echoes the proem in 
which Herodotus notes that ‘most of those cities which were important in the past 
have diminished in significance by now, and those which were great in my own 
time were small in times past’ (‘τὰ γὰρ τὸ πάλαι μεγάλα ἦν, τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν 
σμικρὰ γέγονε, τὰ δὲ ἐπ᾽ ἐμεῦ ἦν μεγάλα, πρότερον ἦν σμικρά.’ 1.5.4). In a 
similar vein, the privileging of personal experience is reminiscent of Thucydides’ 
methodological agenda. The parallels to the respective authorial reflections 
notwithstanding, the Athenians’ preference for the recent past anticipates a 
tendency in fourth-century speeches to focus on contemporary events.
8
 Myths 
loom large in the epitaphioi logoi and also in the oeuvre of Isocrates with its 
epideictic character and focus on external affairs,
9
 but are rarely referred to in 
symbouleutic and forensic speeches. Likewise, archaic history, with the exception 
of Solon, is given short shrift by the orators. The high esteem for the remote past 
in ancient Greece does not hold good in the assembly and the courtroom of the 
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fourth century BCE. In what follows, I will explore the preference for recent 
exempla in the Attic orators (II) before I add some qualifications, first touching on 
diplomatic speeches (III), then discussing Lycurgus’ speech against Leocrates 
(IV). In a final step, I will return to the modern scepticism about exempla, using it 
to throw into relief the ancient orators’ reticence to engage with the remote past. It 
is crucial to avoid generalizations and to do justice to the wide range of attitudes 
toward the past in ancient Greece, but nevertheless it is possible, I think, to 
pinpoint differences from modern attitudes (V). 
 
II. PREFERENCE FOR THE RECENT PAST IN ORATORY 
 
As I have just mentioned, Isocrates stands out among the orators of 
classical Athens through his numerous references to the mythical past. That being 
said, even his speeches bear witness to the rhetorical predilection for recent 
events. In the Archidamus, a speech against Messene and Theban power politics 
written in the voice of the young Spartan prince, Isocrates turns to Athenian 
history for successful attempts to fight off invaders (6.42):  
 
For we shall find that as a result of dictating to others they lost repute with 
the Hellenes, while by defending themselves against insolent invaders they 
won fame among all mankind. Now if I were to recount the wars of old 
which they fought against the Amazons or the Thracians or the 
Peloponnesians who under the leadership of Eurystheus invaded Attica, no 
doubt I should be thought to speak on matters ancient and remote from the 
present situation; but in their war against the Persians, who does not know 
from what hardships they arose to great good-fortune? 
Τούτους γὰρ εὑρήσομεν, ἐξ ὧν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις προσέταττον, πρὸς 
τοὺς Ἕλληνας διαβληθέντας, ἐξ ὧν δὲ τοὺς ὑβρίζοντας ἠμύνοντο, 
παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκιμήσαντας. Τοὺς μὲν οὖν παλαιοὺς 
κινδύνους εἰ διεξιοίην, οὓς ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς Ἀμαζόνας ἢ Θρᾷκας ἢ 
Πελοποννησίους τοὺς μετ’ Εὐρυσθέως εἰς τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν 
εἰσβαλόντας, ἴσως ἀρχαῖα καὶ πόρρω τῶν νῦν παρόντων λέγειν ἂν 
δοκοίην· ἐν δὲ τῷ Περσικῷ πολέμῳ τίς οὐκ οἶδεν ἐξ οἵων συμφορῶν 
εἰς ὅσην εὐδαιμονίαν κατέστησαν; 
 
Clarke notes that ‘this is a strange claim to find in a speech written by 
Isocrates, given his exceptionally extensive use of ancient examples, including 
these very ones disclaimed here. We must, presumably, attribute the inconsistency 
to his characterization of the dramatic figure of Archidamus …’10 Indeed, the 
rejection of mythical exempla helps to characterize Archidamus, but it also 
expresses a general scepticism that comes to the fore in other speeches in which 
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Isocrates introduces references to the remote past with apologies or 
qualifications.
11
 
Dinarchus’ speech against Demosthenes illustrates that this kind of 
scepticism is not limited to mythical events. Looking for examples of men who 
stood by the city in dangerous times, Dinarchus points out (37): 
 
It would be a long task to tell of these great men of the past, Aristeides and 
Themistocles, who built the walls of the city and brought the tribute paid 
freely and willingly by the Greeks to the Acropolis. 
ὧν τοὺς μὲν ἀρχαίους ἐκείνους μακρὸν ἂν εἴη λέγειν, Ἀριστείδην καὶ 
Θεμιστοκλέα, τοὺς ὀρθώσαντας τὰ τείχη τῆς πόλεως καὶ τοὺς φόρους 
εἰς ἀκρόπολιν ἀνενεγκόντας παρ᾽ ἑκόντων καὶ βουλομένων τῶν 
Ἑλλήνων … 
 
 Instead, Dinarchus elaborates on politicians of the fourth century BCE, 
namely Thrason, Eleius and Phormion. Here as in many other cases, the trope of 
praeteritio permits an orator to express his reservation about the remote past, be it 
myth or the fifth century BCE, while still tapping into it for exempla.  
A passage from Demosthenes corroborates that the orators’ preference for 
the 4
th
 century BCE is not rooted in a rigid juxtaposition of myth and history, but 
expresses a relative and flexible distinction between recent and remote events. In 
the speech against Androtion, composed in 355 BCE, Demosthenes attacks 
Androtion for proposing crowns for the Council of the past year. The Council had 
not provided any new triremes and was therefore liable to a decree that made the 
crowns for councillors contingent on the building of ships. In order to drive home 
the importance of war ships to Athens, Demosthenes looks to the past. His first 
exemplum is the battle of Salamis (22.13):  
 
You know of course from tradition that after they abandoned the city and 
shut themselves up in Salamis, it was because they had the war-galleys 
that they won the sea-fight and saved the city and all their belongings, and 
made themselves the authors for the rest of the Greeks of many great 
benefits, of which not even time can ever obliterate the memory.  
… ἴστε δήπου τοῦτο ἀκοῇ, ὅτι τὴν πόλιν ἐκλιπόντες καὶ 
κατακλεισθέντες εἰς Σαλαμῖνα, ἐκ τοῦ τριήρεις ἔχειν πάντα μὲν τὰ 
σφέτερα αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν πόλιν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ νικήσαντες ἔσωσαν, 
πολλῶν δὲ καὶ μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι κατέστησαν 
αἴτιοι, ὧν οὐδ᾽ ὁ χρόνος τὴν μνήμην ἀφελέσθαι δύναται. 
 
Anticipating the objection that ‘this is ancient history’ (‘ἐκεῖνα μὲν 
ἀρχαῖα καὶ παλαιά’), Demosthenes adds an exemplum ‘that you have all seen’ 
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(‘ἃ πάντες ἑοράκατε’, 22.14), namely the help the Athenians could provide for 
the Euboeans thanks to their ships in 357 BCE.  
The argumentum ex negativo follows the same structure: Demosthenes 
first adduces the Decelean War in which the destruction of the fleet led to Athens’ 
ruin and then, asking ‘But why need one cite ancient instances?’ (‘καὶ τί δεῖ τὰ 
παλαιὰ λέγειν;’ 22.15), he mentions the last war against the Spartans in the 370s 
BCE. As in the passage by Dinarchus, recent events provide stronger proof, but 
older ones seem important enough to be mentioned. The qualification as ‘ancient’ 
is relative; it is not only not limited to myth, but can also be applied to various 
stages of the historical past. While in Isocrates the Persian Wars appear as a recent 
event that is juxtaposed with τὰ πάνυ παλαιά, Demosthenes dismisses the 
Persian Wars and even the Peloponnesian War as παλαιά. 
Demosthenes’ praeteritio of the ‘ancient exempla’ indicates a first reason 
why recent events are preferable. He sets the recent intervention on behalf of the 
Euboeans off against the Persian Wars with the words ‘but take something that 
you have all seen’ (‘ἀλλ᾽ ἃ πάντες ἑοράκατε, ἴσθ᾽’, 22.14). In the pair of 
negative exempla, he justifies the reference to the fifth century BCE by saying ‘I 
am reminding you of a bit of old history which you know all better than I do’ 
(‘τῶν γὰρ ἀρχαίων ἕν, ὃ πάντες ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον ἐπίστασθε, ὑπομνήσω’, 22.15). 
Both comments highlight that familiarity is an important requirement that is met 
by recent rather than remote events. Concentrating on familiar topics is not only 
crucial for exempla to be effective, it also contributes to the self-fashioning of the 
orators eager to avoid anything that smacks of elite status. As Ober points out in 
his study on mass and elite in the fourth century BCE: ‘But when using poetic and 
historical examples, the orator must avoid taking on the appearance of a well-
educated man giving lessons in culture to the ignorant masses.’12 
And yet, the requirement of familiarity fails to challenge such stock topics 
as the Persian Wars that are well-known but, as we have seen, nonetheless must 
make way for more recent exempla. Another point favouring recent history is 
mentioned by Anaximenes in the Ars rhetorica where he discusses the part of 
βεβαίωσις (32.3):  
 
One has to take the paradigms that belong to the topic itself and are as 
close as possible to the audience regarding time and place; if such are 
missing, then the grandest and best known of the others.  
λαμβάνειν δὲ δεῖ τὰ παραδείγματα <τὰ> οἰκεῖα τῷ πράγματι καὶ τὰ 
ἐγγύτατα τοῖς ἀκούουσι χρόνῳ ἢ τόπῳ, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχῃ τοιαῦτα, 
τῶν ἄλλων τὰ μέγιστα καὶ γνωριμώτατα.13  
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 Ober 1989: 179. See also 181 on Demosthenes’ use of the ‘everyone knows’ topos. 
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 On the discussion of recent vs. remote exempla in Roman rhetoric, see Chaplin 2000: 123-6. 
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While the second part of the sentence applies the criterion of familiarity to 
paradigms from the remote past, the first encapsulates what makes recent exempla 
attractive beyond the fact that they are well-known. Mentioned together with the 
status of exempla as οἰκεῖος, the requirement that exempla be ‘as close as possible 
to the audience regarding time and place’ suggests that more recent events are 
deemed to be more relevant to the present. We have already encountered this 
point in the Archidamus’ disavowal of mythical events: ‘Perhaps I would seem to 
discuss ancient events and speak far from the present circumstances.’ (‘ἴσως 
ἀρχαῖα καὶ πόρρω τῶν νῦν παρόντων λέγειν ἂν δοκοίην’, Isoc. 6.42). I 
postpone to the end of this paper a discussion on how this relevance of recent 
events relates to the modern conviction that the past is a foreign country. Here it 
may suffice to note that recent events were felt to have had more of a bearing on 
the present just as exempla from the own tradition carried stronger conviction than 
alien ones. 
A third point that renders the recent past more attractive to orators besides 
its familiarity and relevance to the present can be gleaned from Isocrates. 
Shedding new light on the relationship between rhetoric and historiography, this 
point warrants a closer look.
14
 In the Panegyricus, Isocrates brings up the myth of 
Demeter who bestowed on Athens the gifts of corn and the Eleusinian 
Mysteries.
15
 While the introductory apology signals that a myth in this context is 
felt to be not unproblematic (‘For even though the story has taken the form of a 
myth, yet it deserves to be told again.’ – ‘καὶ γὰρ εἰ μυθώδης ὁ λόγος γέγονεν, 
ὅμως αὐτῷ καὶ νῦν ῥηθῆναι προσήκει.’ 4.28), a capping justification reveals ex 
negativo an objection that would be raised by critics (4.30):  
 
In the first place, the very ground on which we might disparage the story, 
namely that it is ancient, would naturally lead us to believe that the events 
actually came to pass; for because many have told and all have heard the 
story which describes them, it is reasonable to regard this not, to be sure, 
as recent, yet as worthy of our faith. In the next place, we are not obliged 
to take refuge in the mere fact that we have received the account and the 
report from remote times; on the contrary, we are able to adduce even 
greater proofs than this regarding what took place. 
Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ὧν ἄν τις καταφρονήσειε τῶν λεγομένων ὡς 
ἀρχαίων ὄντων, ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων εἰκότως ἂν καὶ τὰς πράξεις 
γεγενῆσθαι νομίσειεν. Διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλοὺς εἰρηκέναι καὶ πάντας 
ἀκηκοέναι προσήκει μὴ καινὰ μέν, πιστὰ δὲ δοκεῖν εἶναι τὰ λεγόμενα 
περὶ αὐτῶν.  
                                                 
14
 Woodman 1988 has alerted us to the close entanglement of historiography and rhetoric. At the 
same time, it is important to note that the first historians defined the new genre by setting 
themselves off against the use of the past in oratory, cf. Grethlein 2010: 151-86 (on Herodotus); 
206-39 (on Thucydides). 
15
 On this passage, see also Gotteland 2001: 78-80. 
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Further on in the Panegyricus, Isocrates will argue that the traditions 
preserving knowledge of Athens’ early military achievements over such a long 
span of time attest to their grandeur (4.69). Here, he uses the rich oral tradition as 
proof of the historicity of myth. By transforming an argument against the 
credibility of remote events into evidence of their historicity, Isocrates slyly turns 
the tables. But this is not his only argument: even greater σημεῖα for the Demeter 
myth, he continues, are constituted by the ritual of the first-fruits brought to 
Athens annually from a great number of cities and by the Delphic oracles that 
established this institution (4.30-1). Together present custom and past narratives, 
the shared belief of the Greek poleis and the divine utterances provide powerful 
evidence.
16
 Isocrates’ justification is remarkably sophisticated as it deploys a 
hermeneutic reflection on the significance of oral traditions as well as invoking an 
important ritual as testimony. His rhetorical efforts signal ex negativo that the 
historicity of mythical deeds was liable to be called in question, more specifically 
that oral traditions were likely to attract criticism for being unreliable. References 
to the recent past, it seems, were deemed to be more trustworthy. 
The same issue re-surfaces in the Panathenaicus.
17
 After a lengthy account 
of the history of Athens’ constitution, Isocrates anticipates the critique that ‘I dare 
to speak as if I had exact knowledge of things, although I was not present when 
they were done’ (‘τολμῶ λέγειν ὡς ἀκριβῶς εἰδὼς περὶ πραγμάτων, οἷς οὐ 
παρῆν πραττομένοις’, 12.149). The objection to reliance on oral traditions is 
here phrased as the need for autopsy. Isocrates offers a two-fold defence against 
the anonymous advocati diaboli: he points out that ‘many men with reason’ 
(πολλοὶ καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντες ταὐτόν) share his belief. This argument may not be as 
strong as the ritual on which he capitalizes in the case of the Demeter myth, but he 
parallels it in relying on the agreement of the majority as a criterion for the 
veracity of accounts. With his second point, Isocrates goes beyond the arguments 
put forth in the Archidamus, supporting his position by a general epistemological 
consideration (12.150):  
 
… I could show that all men are possessed of more truth gained through 
hearing than through seeing and that they have knowledge of greater and 
nobler deeds which they have heard from others than those which they 
have witnessed themselves. 
… δυνηθείην ἂν ἐπιδεῖξαι πάντας ἀνθρώπους πλείους ἐπιστήμας 
ἔχοντας διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς ἢ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ μείζους πράξεις καὶ καλλίους 
εἰδότας, ἃς παρ᾽ ἑτέρων ἀκηκόασιν ἢ ᾽κείνας, αἷς αὐτοὶ 
παραγεγενημένοι τυγχάνουσιν.  
                                                 
16
 Mikkola 1954: 117 draws attention to the prominence of the aspect of ‘together’ (2.31: 
συνδοκεῖ, συμμαρτυρεῖ, ὁμολογεῖ). 
17
 Cf. Gotteland 2001: 81-4. 
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Scholars have been quick to link Isocrates’ defence of oral traditions to the 
methodological issues pondered by historians. It is widely assumed that he 
challenges Herodotus’ and Thucydides’ aprovement of autopsy while paving the 
way for his alleged students Duris and Theopompus who would abandon the 
critical standards established by the latter.
18
 There is however little evidence, if 
any, for a school of rhetoric historiography founded by Isocrates and its existence 
has been effectively challenged by recent scholarship.
19
 I think it is also mistaken 
to assume that Isocrates levels his reflections specifically against Herodotus and 
Thucydides. The high esteem in which autopsy is held is not specific to 
historiography. Heraclitus and Thales also seem to have preferred eyesight over 
hearsay and passages from Homer, and the Corpus Hippocraticum, tragedy and 
comedy highlight how widely spread this evaluation of autopsy was in Greek 
culture.
20
 Moreover, Herodotus and Thucydides in actuality do make use of oral 
traditions; the methodological reflections of the latter do not even signal a 
preference for autopsy (1.22.2).
21
 
This is not to deny that Isocrates uses a concept of proof that resembles the 
historians’ efforts to find out what happened. The notion of πίστις figures 
prominently in the two passages under consideration; σημεῖα (4.30), ἀκριβῶς 
(12.149), ἔλεγχος (12.150) and ἀλήθεια (12.150) are other terms that signal 
Herodotus’ and Thucydides’ reliance on proof.22 This, however, does not mean 
that Isocrates borrows these terms from the historians, let alone that he challenges 
their approaches. The tendency to construct intellectual history as a linear 
development dominated by references to the authors whom we have come to 
consider canonical is as common as it is mistaken. Even when considering the 
scanty transmission of fifth-century literature, enough is bequeathed to us to 
glimpse that the ‘language of proof’ was shared by authors working on a great 
variety of subjects.
23
 Physiologists and Presocratics also based their conclusions 
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 On Isocrates’ reflections as challenging Thucydides, see Schmitz-Kahlmann 1939: 56-60; 
Gotteland 2001: 83-4; on Isocrates’ reflections as breaking the ground for later historiography, see 
Avenarius 1956: 81-5; Schmitz-Kahlmann 1939: 60-2; Nickel 1991. On the other hand, Flower 
1994: 50-1 correctly observes that Isocrates in Panath. 149-50 and also in Paneg. 7-10 does not 
comment on historiography. On both passages, see also Marincola 1997: 276-9. On Thucydides’ 
influence on Isocrates, see the survey by Nouhaud 1982: 115-17. 
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 Cf. Flower 1994: 42-62. 
20
 Heraclitus DK 22 B 55, Thales ap. Stobaeus, Florilegium 3.12.14; In Homer, see Il. 2.484-93; 
Od. 3.92-5 and 3.186-7; 16.470 with the interpretation of Marincola 1997: 63-4. Physiologists, e.g. 
De arte 1.17; in tragedy, see for example Aesch. Pers. 266-7; in comedy Ar. Thesm. 5-19. For a 
survey with more references, see Nenci 1953: 17-29.  
21
 Cf. Marincola 1997: 67-9. 
22
 σημεῖον, e.g. Thuc. 1.21.1 (in Herodotus with the primary meaning ‘sign, mark’, cf. Thomas 
2000: 192), ἀκρίβεια, e.g. Thuc. 1.22.1, ἔλεγχος, e.g. Hdt. 2.22 (not used by Thucydides for his 
own work), ἀλήθεια, e.g. Thuc. 1.22.1 (ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων). 
23
 For the ‘language of proof’, see Thomas 2000: 190-200, who puts Herodotus in the context of 
fifth century BCE science. On the relation between the first historians and forensic rhetoric, see 
Butti de Lima 1996: 79-185; for Thucydides, see also Siewert 1985. 
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on σημεῖα and invoked ἐλέγχη24 just as orators would strive for ἀλήθεια and 
ἀκρίβεια.25 The notion of evidence addressed by Isocrates was not put on the 
agenda by Herodotus and Thucydides, but was an issue simultaneously pondered 
by orators, philosophers, scientists and historians. In this complex traffic of ideas 
it is hard to make out the clear-cut dependencies of which older scholarship is so 
fond. Instead of revealing an Isocratean challenge to Thucydides, the parallel 
employment of the ‘language of proof’ rather bespeaks the practical relevance of 
Thucydides’ methodological standards.26  
A fragment from Theopompus’ Philippica illustrates that the credibility of 
ancient exempla adduced by orators was indeed a subject for controversy. In the 
Progymnasmata of Theon we find the note that Theopompus blamed the 
Athenians for concocting (‘καταψεύδεται’) the oath of the Greeks before Plataea, 
a peace with the King (generally identified with the Callias Peace or the Epilycus 
treaty with Darius in 424/3 BCE) and a wrong account of Marathon:
27
 “the city of 
Athens also brags with other stories and deceives the Greeks” (‘“καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα” 
φησίν “ἡ Ἀθηναίων πόλις ἀλαζονεύεται καὶ παρακρούεται τοὺς Ἕλληνας.”’ 
FGrH 115 F 153).
28
 The numerous textual and historical problems which this 
fragment raises need not concern us here.
29
 Crucial for my argument is that 
Theopompus seems to take issue with the rhetorical self-fashioning of Athens. 
According to Theon, Theopompus did not criticize historians, but the city of 
Athens, which suggests their public orators.  
We can even make a conjecture about the context of their references to the 
documents that are not historical in the eyes of Theopompus. Book 25 from which 
Theon takes his quotation covers the year 348 BCE, as another fragment reveals.
30
 
In De falsa legatione dating from 343 BCE, Demosthenes reports that after the 
fall of Olynthus in 348 BCE Aeschines agitated against Philip and had the 
psephisma of Miltiades read out to take on the Persians without the Spartans as 
well as the psephisma of Themistocles to vacate Athens and the oath of the 
ephebes (19.303). He swayed the assembly and was elected as one of the 
ambassadors sent out to the other poleis. The documents called into question by 
Theopompus are very much like the ones invoked by Aeschines: dating from or 
pretending to date from the fifth century BCE, they lent themselves to glorifying 
                                                 
24
 See, e.g., for σημεῖον On ancient Medicine 14; Melissus DK 30 B 8.1; for ἔλεγχος, Parmenides 
DK 28 B 7.5; De diaeta 1.1. 
25
 We have very little oratory from the fifth century BCE, but see Antiphon 2.4.1 for ἀλήθεια and 
4.3.1 for ἀκρίβεια. 
26
 Cf. Grethlein 2010: 274-6. 
27
 The last point is echoed in Plut. De Herodoti malignitate 862D. 
28
 It is worth pointing out that the activities of both ἀλαζόω and παρακρούομαι are reproaches 
that are levelled against sophistic orators elsewhere, e.g. Isoc. 12.20; 271. 
29
 See the discussion by Connor 1968: 77-92 and for further literature Flower 1994: 59 n. 60; 
Gauger 2010: 215-6. On the question of whether Theopompus assumes partial or total forgery of 
the documents, see Meister 1982: 59-60. 
30
 Cf. Schaefer 1886: II: 168 n. 2 and 184 n. 1. 
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Athens’ power. Given that book 25 covers the very period in which Aeschines’ 
speech falls, it is a plausible suggestion that Theopompus challenges the historical 
exempla that were deployed by Aeschines or other speakers to mobilize the 
assembly after the fall of Olynthus.
31
 Theopompus’ critique provides us with a 
background for Isocrates’ concern with the credibility of mythical exempla that 
must have been even more liable to questioning than references to the fifth 
century BCE. 
Modern scholars have not failed to follow up Theopompus’ scepticism. In 
an important article from 1961, Habicht discusses a number of documents on the 
Persian Wars, some, including the above-mentioned psephisma of Miltiades, only 
available as literary sources, others also preserved in inscriptions such as the 
Themistocles-psephisma.
32
 Habicht notes that there is no evidence for most of 
these documents from the fifth century BCE and argues that they are forgeries 
mostly of the 340s BCE. Since there is no historian who is likely to be responsible 
for the invention of all these documents, he proposes that they were brought to life 
by orators to suit their argumentative needs. Habicht’s thesis has triggered a 
controversial debate. While some scholars elaborated on and expanded his list of 
forgeries, others were more reserved.
33
 Individual cases have been disputed and 
more generally it has been doubted that, given the ancient attitude towards 
documents, forgery is an appropriate category. While our understanding of 
documents requires the original or a copy ad litteram, for the Greeks ‘only the 
content mattered, and the form had secondary relevance. The wording did not 
have to be identical in all details if the most important was said.’34 That being 
said, some documents such as the Themistocles psephisma were undoubtedly 
invented
35
 and Theopompus F 153 illustrates that fourth-century Greeks were not 
insensitive to the issue.  
The practice of quoting documents, whether forged or not, reinforces the 
idea that quibbles about the veracity of historical references were more than a 
                                                 
31
 Cf. Schaefer 1886: II: 168; Schwartz 1900: 108 n. 4; Jacoby 1929: ad loc.; Habicht 1961: 12-3. 
The other contexts that have been suggested for Theopompus’ critique are far less convincing: a 
retrospect on the relations between Athens, Delphi and the Phocaeans in the Third Holy War (von 
Fritz 1970: 63); Olympian Games in Macedonian Dion after the capture of Olynthus (Pane 1957: 
155-6). 
32
 Habicht 1961. 
33
 Habicht’s approach is taken up, e.g., in the contributions to Sordi 1971. For a more sceptical 
position, see Welles 1966. Thomas 1989: 91-3 reflects critically on the appropriateness of the 
notion of forgery for fourth-century texts. Davies 1996 offers some systematic reflections on the 
forgery of documents which in his view did not take place in the 340s BCE, as argued by Habicht, 
but right after 404 BCE (35-6). Robertson 1976 dates the forgeries in the decade from 378-68 
BCE. For a survey focussing on possible forgeries of inscriptions, see Chaniotis 1988: 265-77, 
who presents a four-fold classification that aptly distinguishes between authenticity and historicity. 
34
 Klaffenbach 1960: 34: ‘Für sie kam es allein auf den Inhalt an, und die Form trat hinter ihm 
zurück. Der Wortlaut brauchte durchaus nicht in allen Einzelheiten identisch zu sein, 
vorausgesetzt, daß alles Wesentliche gesagt war.’ See also Graham 1960: 109-10 for striking 
examples of this attitude towards documents. 
35
 Cf. Habicht 1961: 2-11; Braccesi 1968: ???; Chaniotis 1988: 267. 
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rhetorical play of Isocrates.
36
 That the orators cited documents in order to buttress 
the historicity of past events is made explicit by Lycurgus. After narrating how 
Pausanias was punished by the Spartans, he mentions that the Spartans made a 
law ‘concerning all who are unwilling to take risks for the fatherland’ (‘περὶ 
ἁπάντων τῶν μὴ ᾽θελόντων ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος κινδυνεύειν’). He introduces 
the reading of the law as follows: ‘So that you may know that I have not told a 
story without proof but one with true examples, take the law for them.’ (‘ἵνα δ᾽ 
εἰδῆτε ὅτι οὐ λόγον ἀναπόδεικτον εἴρηκα, ἀλλὰ μετ᾽ ἀληθείας ὑμῖν 
παραδείγματα, φέρε αὐτοῖς τὸν νόμον.’ 129).  
Walbank notes that ‘in both classical and Hellenistic Greece the past was 
important not simply as the subject-matter of historians, but also as an element in 
public life and sentiment. Consciousness of the past penetrated political activity to 
an extent which would seem strange today.’37 Indeed, the past was omnipresent in 
ancient Greece, but the past was not a uniform entity and it is possible to 
differentiate various contexts conducive to the deployment of different parts of it. 
The larger-than-life frame and the malleability of myth rendered its stories highly 
suited to entertain audiences and negotiate issues of identity and moral conduct in 
the elevated settings of the symposium and public ceremonies. They undermined 
however its value for symbouleutic and forensic oratory. In the antagonistic 
debates of the assembly and law-court, ancient exempla were open to be 
challenged as not trustworthy. References to the non-mythical distant past, with 
notable exceptions such as the Persian Wars, lacked familiarity and were thus in 
danger of estranging the audience. Proximity to the world of the audience in 
general increased the persuasiveness of exempla marshalled by orators.  
 
III. MYTH IN DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS 
 
The trope of praeteritio signals that the remote past, while less compelling 
than events closer to the present, was not without argumentative value. 
Diplomatic controversies in particular feature mythical references.
38
 A case in 
point is the famous Delian speech that Hyperides delivered to the Council of the 
                                                 
36
 This touches on the complex issue of the status of documents in classical Greece, especially the 
question as to what extent they were used as evidence. Especially the early historians seem to have 
made far less use of documents than one might suspect, cf. West 1985 on Herodotus; Smarczyk 
2006 on Thucydides; Biraschi 2003 and Rhodes 2007 for surveys. Nonetheless, there can be no 
doubt that in the fourth-century orators used written documents to prove the veracity of their 
accounts, see Lewis 1992: 12-18; Smarczyk 2006: 496. This use of written evidence has to be 
viewed against the backdrop of the increasing literacy in fourth-century Athens, as demonstrated 
by Thomas 1989: 83-93. Sickinger 1999: 173-6 seems to be more optimistic about the use of 
inscriptions in the fifth century BCE than Thomas. On the status of inscriptions in classical Greece 
in general, see Lewis 1992; Rhodes 2001.  
37
 Walbank 2002: 179. 
38
 Cf. Nilsson 1951: 81; 88; Perlman 1961: 159; Parker 1996: 227. For discussions on the use of 
myth in diplomatic speeches mostly from the fourth century BCE, see Bickermann 1928: 42-5; 
Parker 1996: 223-5; Natoli 2004: 67-8. 
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Delphic Amphictyony to buttress Athens’ claims to manage the Apollo temple on 
Delos. Unfortunately, the speech has not been preserved, but we know from 
Maximus Planudes: ‘striving to show them that the Athenian claims to the 
Delphic temple reach back far, he makes much use of myth’ (‘βουλόμενος γὰρ 
ἐκεῖνος ἐξ ἀρχαίου δεῖξαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὰ ἐν Δήλῳ ἱερὰ προσήκοντα 
πολλῷ κέχρηται τῷ μύθῳ …’, 5.481 Walz). More specifically, a fragment from 
the speech makes it likely that Hyperides did not fail to capitalize on the 
foundation of Delos as an Athenian apoikia (fr. 72), while another shows that he 
went back even further to underscore the Athenian claims: the pregnant Leto 
loosened her girdle at Cape Zoster near Athens and also seems to have passed by 
the temple of Athena Pronoia (fr. 67). Robert Parker suggests that Hyperides also 
invoked the mysterious offerings coming from the Hyperboreans via Prasiae  and 
the first pilgrimage to Delos led by Erysichthon, which is mentioned in the 
contemporaneous Atthis by Phanodemus.
39
  
Aeschines provides us with another example of the deployment of 
mythical references in diplomacy. The speech that he gave as ambassador to 
Philip in 346 BCE, trying to justify the Athenian claim to Amphipolis, has not 
been transmitted either,
40
 but in his defence against Demosthenes’ charges that he 
accepted bribery from Philip three years later, Aeschines repeats its argument 
(2.31):  
 
As to the original founding of the site, the so-called Nine Roads, and the 
sons of Theseus, one of whom, Acamas, is said to have received this 
territory as dowry for his wife, these were themes that it was appropriate to 
narrate at that point and that were dealt with in as much detail as possible; 
on this occasion, however, I suppose I must cut short my account. 
περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς κτήσεως τῆς χώρας, καὶ τῶν καλουμένων 
Ἐννέα ὁδῶν, καὶ περὶ τῶν Θησέως παίδων, ὧν Ἀκάμας λέγεται 
φερνὴν ἐπὶ τῇ γυναικὶ λαβεῖν τὴν χώραν ταύτην, τότε μὲν ἥρμοττέ τε 
λέγειν καὶ ἐρρήθη ὡς ἐνεδέχετο ἀκριβέστατα, νυνὶ δὲ ἴσως ἀνάγκη 
συντέμνειν τοὺς λόγους.41  
 
In his address to Philip, Aeschines thus traced back Athens’ title to 
Amphipolis to Acamas who received the town as dowry for his marriage with the 
                                                 
39
 Parker 1996: 224-5. 
40
 Thomas 1989: 69-71 notes that Aeschines’ references to decrees are far more sophisticated than 
those of his contemporaries, as he uses them to establish chronologies and fully exploits the public 
records as part of his rhetoric.  
41
 The qualification ὡς ἐνεδέχετο ἀκριβέστατα reveals the concern with the credibility of 
mythical references that we have just studied in Isocrates. Concerning the recent events mentioned 
in the preceding paragraphs, Aeschines assures his audience: ‘And for all my statements, I 
provided as witness the letters of the individuals concerned, the decrees of the people, and 
Callisthenes’ truce.’ (‘καὶ πάντων ὧν εἴποιμι μάρτυρας τὰς ἐκείνων ἐπιστολὰς παρειχόμην 
καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα τοῦ δήμου καὶ τὰς Καλλισθένους ἀνοχάς.’ 2.31). 
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Thracian princess Phyllis. In De falsa legatione, however, he decides not to spell 
out the mythical stories: ‘What I shall recall is the evidence I provided not from 
ancient myths but from events in our own time.’ (‘ἃ δὲ ἦν τῶν σημείων οὐκ ἐν 
τοῖς ἀρχαίοις μύθοις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν γεγενημένα, τούτων ἐπεμνήσθην.’ 2.31). 
While cutting short the mythical part of his argument, Aeschines expands upon 
the reference he made to the Peace of 371 BCE, notably Amyntas’ vote ‘to join 
the Greeks in helping the Athenians to capture Amphipolis, Athens’ property’ 
(‘Ἀμφίπολιν τὴν Ἀθηναίων συνεξαιρεῖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων 
Ἀθηναίοις’, 32). He continues to quote in direct speech his words to Philip: ‘What 
Amyntas renounced in front of the whole of Greece not only in words but also 
with his vote, it is not right for you, his son, to lay claim to.’ (‘ὧν δὲ Ἀμύντας 
ἀπέστη [ὁ Φιλίππου πατὴρ] ἐναντίον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἁπάντων οὐ μόνον 
λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψήφῳ, τούτων … σὲ τὸν ἐξ ἐκείνου γεγενημένον οὐκ ἔστι 
δίκαιον ἀντιποιεῖσθαι.’ 2.33). Carey notes that ‘the argument might well impress 
an Athenian audience, but it rests on the untested assumption that Athens still 
“owned” a city that had revolted from it two generations earlier and had never 
been recaptured’.42 Perhaps this argument had been less prominent in the speech 
levelled at Philip, which, it may be surmised, instead gave more space to the 
mythical precedent. Different contexts render different parts of the past attractive. 
The work of Antipater of Magnesia has been described by Jacoby as ‘übles 
produkt einer adulatorisch-höfischen historie, das respect vor der Haltung des 
Isokrates und Theopompos erweckt’ (FGrH 69), but one of the few testimonies 
grants us a further glimpse of the discussion about Amphipolis. In his letter to 
Philip, Speusippus warmly recommends the historian. One of the points singled 
out by Speusippus is Antipater’s account of how Heracles freed the area of 
Amphipolis from Syleus, entrusting it to Dicaeus, but that later ‘Athenians and 
Chalcidians took Amphipolis that belonged to the Heracleidans’ (‘τὴν δὲ 
Ἀμφιπολῖτιν Ἡρακλειδῶν οὖσαν Ἀθηναίους καὶ Χαλκιδεῖς λαβεῖν’, 6). 
Speusippus caps his list of further similar deeds of Heracles with the comment: 
‘and this is not a pretext à la Isocrates and not mere noise of names, but words that 
can aid your empire’ (‘καὶ ταῦτά ἐστιν οὐ πρόφασις Ἰσοκράτους οὐδὲ 
ὀνομάτων ψόφος, ἀλλὰ λόγοι δυνάμενοι τὴν σὴν ἀρχὴν ὠφελεῖν’, 8). Whilst 
Hyperides had anchored the Athenian title in the Athenian king Acamas, 
Antipater would allow the Macedonians to do one better and reach back even 
further into the past by invoking Heracles. As the controversy about Amphipolis 
suggests, the mythical past offered diplomatic capital fiercely fought over by 
speakers.  
Does this use of mythical exempla in diplomatic exchanges challenge my 
thesis that the remote past, while dominating in the festive contexts of poetry and 
epideictic speeches, was of less value in more pragmatic interactions? Diplomats 
negotiated the weighty matters of foreign politics and nonetheless seem to have 
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 Carey 2000: 106 n. 58. 
Manuscript. Final version published in: C. Pieber, J. Kerr; eds. (2014) Valuing the 
Past in the Greco-Roman World. Leiden: 326-354 
 
relied on myths. This being said, a further look at De falsa legatione intimates that 
the same reservations applied to the distant past in diplomatic speeches as in other 
oratory, and that mythical exempla were significant for a specific point that was 
prominent in diplomatic exchanges. In the paragraphs preceding the passage 
quoted, Aeschines attempts to prove Athens’ eunoia and euergesiai toward 
Macedonia. For this, he mentions the support for Amyntas III (2.26), who in the 
second half of the 380s BCE had lost his power to Argaeus for two years and was 
then reinstalled with the help of the Athenians. In 368 BCE the Athenian general 
Iphicrates protected Eurydice and Perdiccas against Pausanias (2.27-9). Despite 
the war Perdiccas started with Athens to acquire Amphipolis, the Athenians, 
victorious in 363/2 BCE, showed philanthropia towards Macedonia and granted it 
a fair truce (30). Given that the Macedonian kings traced their ancestry back to 
Heracles, it would have been easy to capitalize on mythical stories to highlight 
Athens’ benevolence toward Macedonia.43 And yet, instead of referencing, for 
example, the reception of the Heraclidae in Athens, Aeschines opts for the history 
of the last fifty years. Recent events, he obviously sensed, presented more 
powerful evidence of Athens’ helpfulness than the venerable mythical tradition. 
References to the ancient past, on the other hand, are found especially 
where questions of origin are at stake. As Hyperides’ Delian speech and 
Aeschines’ Amphipolis speech illustrate, myths constituted precious capital for 
claims to land and other titles in foreign affairs.
44
 The distance from the present 
that in other contexts tended to undermine the relevance of myth increased its 
value in cases as when the original ownership of a plot of land was being 
investigated. This value applied not only to conflicting claims to some rights, but 
also to alliances.
45
 At the conference in Sparta in 371 BCE, for example, the 
Athenian ambassador Callias strengthened his argument for peace by referring to 
myth, if we follow Xenophon’s account (Hell. 6.3.6):  
 
… the first strangers to whom Triptolemus, our ancestor, revealed the 
mystic rites of Demeter and Core were Heracles, your state’s founder, and 
the Dioscuri, your citizens; and further, that it was upon Peloponnesus that 
he first bestowed the seed of Demeter’s fruit.  
… λέγεται μὲν Τριπτόλεμος ὁ ἡμέτερος πρόγονος τὰ Δήμητρος καὶ 
Κόρης ἄρρητα ἱερὰ πρώτοις ξένοις δεῖξαι Ἡρακλεῖ τε τῷ ὑμετέρῳ 
ἀρχηγέτῃ καὶ Διοσκούροιν τοῖν ὑμετέροιν πολίταιν, καὶ τοῦ 
Δήμητρος δὲ καρποῦ εἰς πρώτην τὴν Πελοπόννησον σπέρμα 
δωρήσασθαι. 
                                                 
43
 For an argument focusing on Heracles as Macedonian ancestor, see Iust. 11.4.5-6, who reports 
that in 335 BCE the Thebans reminded Alexander that the city he was about to destroy was the 
birthplace of Heracles. 
44
 Cf. Parker 1996: 227, who balances the use of mythical arguments with the observation that 
such questions seem to have been decided by considerations of exigency rather than of the past. 
45
 For further examples, see Gotteland 2001: 343-50. 
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The argument has particular force in the mouth of Callias, a scion of the 
Ceryces family that traditionally held one of the chief offices at the Eleusinian 
Mysteries.  
While Callias’ speech, as reported by Xenophon, presents a mythical 
precedence for amiable relations between two poleis, myth lent itself in particular 
to claims to kinship, a connection that was often invoked when favours were 
being asked.
46
 An inscription from Xanthus reports a late, but striking instance of 
kinship diplomacy (SEG XXXVIII 1476).
47
 In 206/5 BCE an embassy from 
Cytinium beseeched Xanthus to support the rebuilding of their wall, tracing back 
the kinship between the poleis to the age of gods and heroes. While only giving 
500 drachmae, the Xanthians went out of their way to record details of the 
embassy epigraphically, including the references to ancient history in the speech 
of the Cytinians. In this and other cases of kinship diplomacy, references to origin 
helped to make claims in the present and thereby rendered the tales of myth 
precious material. 
 
IV. THE DISTANT PAST IN LYCURGUS’ AGAINST LEOCRATES 
 
While being most prominent in diplomatic negotiations, references to myth 
and distant epochs of history are by no means limited to interstate encounters. 
Take for example Dinarchus’ speech against Demosthenes: trying to dissuade the 
jurors from revising their condemnation of Demosthenes for his role in the 
Harpalus affair by the Areopag, Dinarchus invokes the trials of Poseidon vs. Ares 
and the Erinyes vs. Orestes. In both cases, he points out, the persecutors accepted 
the acquittal of the accused by the Areopag, while Demosthenes is unwilling to 
bow to its verdict (1.87). Note that Dinarchus does not marshal myth to 
appropriate the origins of a title, but to have a parallel to the present situation. The 
comparison with gods and heroes permits him to conclude a maiore ad minus. 
Such references to the remote past, though, are not frequent in our corpus of non-
epideictic and non-diplomatic speeches. A noteworthy exception that merits a 
closer look is Lycurgus’ Against Leocrates.48  
In 331 or 330 BCE,
49
 Lycurgus charged in an eisangelia-trial the Athenian 
blacksmith Leocrates with treason for having left Athens in the aftermath of the 
defeat at Chaeronea (338 BCE). References to the fifth century BCE as well as to 
the mythical age abound in his speech: Lycurgus touches on Troy and Messene to 
illustrate the fate of destroyed cities (69), contrasts Leocrates’ cowardly departure 
with the ancestors who left Athens to counter the Persians’ attack at Salamis (68-
                                                 
46
 On kinship diplomacy in ancient Greece, see Jones 1999 and Clarke 2008: 347-63. 
47
 For the editio princeps, with translation and commentary, see Bousquet 1988; for a succinct 
overview, see Osborne 2011: 108-12. 
48
 On this speech, see Burke 1977; Allen 2000; Engels 2008; Scholz 2009; Steinbock 2011. 
49
 For literature on the date, see Steinbock 2011: 280 n. 1. 
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70) and praises the empire which their victory helped to establish (72-4). The 
quotation and discussion of the ephebic oath and the oath sworn by the Greek 
allies before Plataea (75-82) lead to the exemplum of the mythical king Codrus 
who sacrificed himself to avert the danger of a Spartan invasion (83-8). A further 
legendary tale about a pious man who risked his life to save his father from an 
eruption of Mount Etna underscores the gods’ moral concern with human affairs 
(95-7). The mention of Erechtheus is backed up by a lengthy quotation from 
Euripides’ play (100-1), followed by passages from the Iliad (102-3) and Tyrtaeus 
(105-7). The heroes of the Persian Wars are evoked again as a contrast foil to 
Leocrates (104; 108-10) before Lycurgus presents a list of exempla of rigorous 
punishment from the fifth century BCE, namely the general Phrynichus (112-16), 
Hipparchus, the first Athenian to be ostracized (117-19), the ψήφισμα against 
deserters issued in the Decelean War (120-21), a counsellor who was executed on 
account of having pleaded to accept Mardonius’ peace offer (122), the 
Demophontes decree (124-6) and the Spartan Pausanias (128-29).  
The pervasiveness of myth and fifth-century history in our only preserved 
speech from Lycurgus is striking.
50
 Simultaneously, Against Leocrates betrays the 
same scepticism towards the distant past as other speeches in the fourth century 
BCE. Lycurgus introduces the reference to Troy and Messene as follows: ‘if I can 
mention the more distant past’ (‘εἰ καὶ παλαιότερον εἰπεῖν ἐστι’, 62) and 
qualifies the quotation of the oath taken before Plataea as ‘deeds happened long 
ago’ (‘παλαιῶν ὄντων τῶν τότε πεπραγμένων’, 80). Likewise, he feels 
obliged to justify the Sicilian legend: ‘There is a story, which, even if it is rather 
fantastic, is suitable for all you younger men to hear.’ (‘εἰ γὰρ καὶ μυθωδέστερόν 
ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἁρμόσει καὶ νῦν ἅπασι τοῖς νεωτέροις ἀκοῦσαι’, 95). Lycurgus 
hence shares his contemporaries’ qualms about the distant past. His indulgence 
therein must be explained by the way in which he engages with it. 
It is not incidental, I suggest, that two of the qualifications are added to 
non-Athenian exempla which do not feature acts of virtue that throw into relief 
Leocrates’ alleged crime: Troy and Messene only illustrate the fate of destroyed 
cities. The piety of the Sicilian may implicitly contrast with Lycurgus’ lack of 
eusebeia, but it is primarily invoked to prove divine concern with moral standards 
in general. It is also noteworthy that the third justification for bringing up ancient 
history pertains to Plataea, which, being associated with the Spartans, was the 
least prominent of the great battles against the Persians in Athenian memory.
51
 
                                                 
50
 It is impossible to reach safe conclusions about the role of myth and ancient history in Lycurgus’ 
speeches in general, but there are signs that Against Leocrates may not have been that exceptional: 
our meagre corpus of fragments reveals that in the speech against Lycophron, Lycurgus referred to 
Hipparchus, the son of Pisistratus, and to Erichthoneus (F X-XI 6 and 7) while conjuring up the 
achievements of Pericles at another occasion (F IX 2). It is also worth noting that Hermogenes 
Περὶ ἰδεῶν B p. 416 (H. Rabe p. 402, 14) notes Lycurgus’ penchant for digressions on myth, 
history and poetry in general. 
51
 Cf. Jung 2006: 293. 
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That there are no comparable qualifications for the bulk of Athenian exempla 
immediately contrasting with Leocrates reveals their special character: Lycurgus 
marshals past deeds as evidence of standards still valid in the present but 
flagrantly violated by the accused. The past on which he draws is not past but still 
present. Besides highlighting the abjectness of Leocrates, the presence of the past 
helps Lycurgus exert pressure on the jury. He repeatedly reminds the jurors of the 
paradigmatic significance of their verdict (9; 27; 150; cf. 119; 127). They are 
deciding not only the fate of an individual, but much more profoundly about 
whether or not the great patriotic tradition will be continued.  
A couple of passages nicely illustrate that Lycurgus evokes a past that he 
considers still present.
52
 Codrus belongs to the distant age when Athens was still a 
monarchy, but Lycurgus nonetheless asks: ‘When the Peloponnesians invade 
Attica, what do your ancestors do, gentlemen of the court?’ (‘ἐμβαλόντων δὲ 
τῶν Πελοποννησίων εἰς τὴν Ἀττικήν, τί ποιοῦσιν οἱ πρόγονοι ὑμῶν, ἄνδρες 
δικασταί;’ 85)? Present tense, the reference to ‘your ancestors’ instead of the king 
and the direct address to the jurors help to obliterate the boundary between 
mythical and democratic Athens. The past is endowed with presence so that it 
does not surprise when Lycurgus goes on to describe the decision of the mythical 
Athenians in light of Leocrates’ treason (85):  
 
They did not abandon the country, as Leocrates did, and flee, nor did they 
betray the land that had nourished them and its temples to the enemy. No, 
although few in number, they were cut off and besieged and endured 
hardship for their country. 
οὐ καταλιπόντες τὴν χώραν ὥσπερ Λεωκράτης ᾤχοντο, οὐδ᾽ 
ἔκδοτον τὴν θρεψαμένην καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις παρέδοσαν, ἀλλ᾽ 
ὀλίγοι ὄντες κατακλεισθέντες ἐπολιορκοῦντο καὶ διεκαρτέρουν εἰς τὴν 
πατρίδα.  
 
In 69, Lycurgus raises the question: ‘What man is so grudging or so 
completely lacking in ambition that he would not pray to have taken part in their 
great deeds?’ (‘τίς δ᾽ οὕτως ἢ φθονερός ἐστιν ἢ παντάπασιν ἀφιλότιμος, ὃς 
οὐκ ἂν εὔξαιτο τῶν ἐκείνοις πεπραγμένων μετασχεῖν;’). So close is the battle 
of Salamis that present-day Athenians could, it seems, step into it without further 
ado. The heroes of Salamis are inversely imagined to consider Leocrates’ flight: 
‘Would any of these men of old have perhaps tolerated such a crime? Wouldn’t 
they have stoned to death the man who brought shame on their own courage?’ (‘ἦ 
που ταχέως ἂν ἠνέσχετό τις ἐκείνων τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοιοῦτον ἔργον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ 
ἂν κατέλευσαν τὸν καταισχύνοντα τὴν αὑτῶν ἀριστείαν;’ 71)? In accordance 
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 See also Steinbock 2011, who argues that Codrus was an eponymic age-set hero (283-306) and 
traces ephebic themes throughout the speech that would have strongly resonated with the Athenian 
audience (306-11).  
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with this interweaving of past and present, Lycurgus muses that in 338 BCE even 
‘the countryside was sacrificing its trees, the dead their tombs’ (‘ἡ μὲν χώρα τὰ 
δένδρα συνεβάλλετο, οἱ δὲ τετελευτηκότες τὰς θήκας’, 43). Lycurgus on the 
other hand is blamed for returning to Athens without feeling shame when he 
passes the tombs as if they could chide him (45, see also 142). The dead are re-
awakened just as the landscape is personified. 
The significance of a past still present is reflected in the samples of poetry 
that Lycurgus inserts into his speech. The samples are obviously chosen to throw 
into relief Leocrates’ depravation and its danger for the polis: the justification that 
Praxithea gives for the sacrifice of her daughter on behalf of the polis contrasts 
effectively with Leocrates’ disavowal of Athens. Likewise, Hector’s appeal to 
face death in order to protect family and home zeros in on the loyalty that 
Leocrates should have shown. Tyrtaeus, heavily drawing on the epic model, not 
only lavishes praise on those dying for their polis, but also condemns the kind of 
flight of which Lycurgus accuses Leocrates (107):  
 
But it is most wretched of all if he leaves behind 
His city and rich fields and goes begging,  
Wandering with his mother and old father, with  
His small children and his wedded wife. 
He will be hated by all those whomever he meets,  
Yielding to poverty and hateful need; 
He brings shame on his family, disgrace to his noble shape; 
Complete dishonor and wretchedness follow him. 
ἣν δ᾽ αὐτοῦ προλιπόντα πόλιν καὶ πίονας ἀγρούς 
πτωχεύειν πάντων ἔστ᾽ ἀνιηρότατον, 
πλαζόμενον σὺν μητρὶ φίλῃ καὶ πατρὶ γέροντι 
παισί τε σὺν μικροῖς κουριδίῃ τ᾽ ἀλόχῳ. 
ἐχθρὸς μὲν γὰρ τοῖσι μετέσσεται, οὕς κεν ἵκηται 
χρημοσύνῃ τ᾽ εἴκων καὶ στυγερῇ πενίῃ, 
αἰσχύνει δὲ γένος, κατὰ δ᾽ ἀγλαὸν εἶδος ἐλέγχει,  
πᾶσα δ᾽ ἀτιμίη καὶ κακότης ἕπεται. 
 
It seems that later Lycurgus even echoes specifically Tyrtaeus’ dark sketch 
of the fate of the refugee when he comments on Leocrates’ exile: ‘For this reason 
no city has allowed him to live there as a metic, but they have driven him out as if 
he were worse than a murderer.’ (‘τοιγαροῦν οὐδεμία πόλις αὐτὸν εἴασε παρ᾽ 
αὑτῇ μετοικεῖν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῶν ἀνδροφόνων ἤλαυνεν, εἰκότως.’ 133). 
As much as the quotations from Euripides, Homer and Tyrtaeus resonate 
with the case of Lycurgus, it is important to take into account also the framework 
in which they are set. Euripides, Lycurgus writes, chose the Erechtheus myth as a 
paradigm through which the Athenians ‘would get accustomed to love their 
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fatherland with their souls’ (‘συνεθίζεσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τὸ τῆν πατρίδα’, 100). 
The didactic intention that is here still vague (‘These verses, gentlemen, formed 
part of our fathers’ education.’ – ‘Ταῦτα ὦ ἄνδρες τοὺς πατέρας ὑμῶν 
ἐπαίδευε.’ 101) is specified in the case of Homer (104):  
 
Your ancestors listened to these verses and were eager to imitate such 
deeds; they were so courageous that they were willing to die not only for 
their own country but for all of Greece as if it were their own land. When 
they took their stand against the barbarians at Marathon and defeated an 
army from all of Asia, by risking their own lives they gained a security 
that was shared by all Greeks. Their fame did not make them arrogant but 
inspired them to live up to their reputation. They made themselves leaders 
of the Greeks and masters over the barbarians. 
Τούτων τῶν ἐπῶν ἀκούοντες ὦ ἄνδρες οἱ πρόγονοι ὑμῶν, καὶ τὰ 
τοιαῦτα τῶν ἔργων ζηλοῦντες, οὕτως ἔσχον πρὸς ἀρετήν, ὥστ’ οὐ 
μόνον ὑπὲρ τῆς αὑτῶν πατρίδος, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάσης <τῆς> Ἑλλάδος ὡς 
κοινῆς <πατρίδος> ἤθελον ἀποθνῄσκειν. οἱ γοῦν ἐν Μαραθῶνι 
παραταξάμενοι τοῖς βαρβάροις τὸν ἐξ ἁπάσης τῆς Ἀσίας στόλον 
ἐκράτησαν, τοῖς ἰδίοις κινδύνοις κοινὴν ἄδειαν ἅπασι τοῖς Ἕλλησι 
κτώμενοι, οὐκ ἐπὶ τῇ δόξῃ μέγα φρονοῦντες, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῷ ταύτης ἄξια 
πράττειν, τῶν μὲν Ἑλλήνων προστάτας, τῶν δὲ βαρβάρων 
δεσπότας ἑαυτοὺς καθιστάντες. 
 
Lycurgus presents the Iliad as the source that inspired the exemplary deeds 
at Marathon. By the same token, Tyrtaeus’ elegies impelled the Spartans to 
achieve greatness, notably the defence of Greece at Thermopylae: ‘The men who 
heard them were so inspired to bravery that they competed with our city for 
leadership and rightly so …’ (‘οὕτω τοίνυν εἶχον πρὸς ἀνδρείαν οἱ τούτων 
ἀκούοντες, ὥστε πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἀμφισβητεῖν, 
εἰκότως.’ 108). Aware of the potentially estranging effect that a Spartan 
exemplum may have on his Athenian audience (128), Lycurgus emphasizes that 
the Spartans ‘were not as lucky’ (‘ταῖς … τύχαις οὐχ ὁμοίαις ἐχρήσαντο’) as 
the Athenians (108) and subscribes to the tradition that Tyrtaeus was an Athenian 
whom the Spartans made their general following the Pythia’s advice (106). 
Besides furnishing the still valid ethics that Leocrates had compromised, the 
quotations from Homer and Tyrtaeus are thus presented as the force behind the 
exemplary comportment in the Persian Wars. Poetry not only ‘re-presents’ the 
past, but also helps to sustain the continuation of its spirit. 
The poetic samples in Against Leocrates are often only seen as a welcome 
addition to the remaining fragments of Euripides and Tyrtaeus. They warrant 
however attention in and of themselves for their function just mentioned reveals 
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that Lycurgus’ speech is more sophisticated than scholars are willing to admit.53 I 
suggest that the quotations offer a meta-rhetorical reflection and can be 
interpreted as a mise-en-abîme. Scholars have not hesitated to read Against 
Leocrates as part of Lycurgus’ restoration programme. Burke, for example, argues 
that, together with Demosthenes’ speech On the Crown, it attests the attempt to 
recover a role for Athens outside the shadow of Macedonia.
54
 I am not sure about 
the exact political context of these efforts, but in my interpretation the poetic 
samples are a signal, encapsulated in the speech, that its goal extends beyond the 
persecution of an individual. Lycurgus marshals the exempla of ancient virtue not 
only to highlight by contrast Leocrates’ guilt, but also to spur their imitation by 
his audience just as Homer and Tyrtaeus provided the spirit for the Persian Wars. 
The effect of poetry as conceived of by Lycurgus thus mirrors the impact that he 
envisages for his exempla-laden speech.  
Lycurgus’ reflections on the function of poetry corroborates this reading 
(102):  
 
… the laws because of their brevity do not teach but merely order what 
one should do; the poets, on the other hand, by representing human life 
and selecting the noblest deeds, persuade men by using both reason and 
clear examples. 
οἱ μὲν γὰρ νόμοι διὰ τὴν συντομίαν οὐ διδάσκουσιν, ἀλλ᾽ 
ἐπιτάττουσιν ἃ δεὶ ποιεῖν, οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ μιμούμενοι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον 
βίον, τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἔργων ἐκλεξάμενοι, μετὰ λόγου καὶ 
ἀποδείξεως τοὺς ἀνθρώπους συμπείθουσιν.  
 
Lycurgus himself lays claim to the activity of διδάσκειν which is here 
ascribed to the poets (13; 111). In 124, Lycurgus even links it with his 
presentation of paradigms: ‘teaching with many examples makes your decision 
easy’ (‘τὸ γὰρ μετὰ πολλῶν παραδειγμάτων διδάσκειν ῥᾳδίαν ὑμῖν τὴν 
κρίσιν καθίστησι.’ 124). Moreover, whilst here arguing that the laws are 
complemented by poetry, Lycurgus also classes them together with prosecutor 
and jury as what ‘protects and saves the democracy and the fortune of the polis’ 
(‘διασῴζει τὴν δημοκρατίαν καὶ τὴν τῆς πόλεως εὐδαιμονίαν’) in 3-4. That 
both the poet as well as the prosecutor together with the judges, are alternatively 
named as reinforcing the guidance provided by the laws for the polis underscores 
the parallel between them. Besides reporting and convicting criminals, prosecutor 
and juror also fulfil the function that is assigned to poetry: not only Euripides 
strives to pick the ‘noblest paradigm’ (‘κάλλιστον … παράδειγμα’, 100), but 
also Lycurgus throughout his speech and explicitly so when he refers to the 
Areopag as ‘noblest paradigm’ (‘κάλλιστον … παράδειγμα’, 12), while the 
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 Burke 1977. For a critique of Burke, see Scholz 2009: 182 with further literature in n. 44. 
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jurors are repeatedly reminded of the paradigmatic function their decision will 
have.
55
  
The use of the superlative form of καλός, rare in forensic speeches,56 
indicates that the function ascribed to poetry and oratory ultimately challenges the 
logos-ergon dichotomy, which Lycurgus wields to flag the gravity of Leocrates’ 
crime, e.g. in 71: ‘Since they considered it justified to take revenge for just a 
speech, wouldn’t they certainly have punished with the harshest penalties the man 
who by his actions betrayed his country into the hands of the enemy?’ (‘ὅπου δὲ 
καὶ τοῦ λόγου τιμωρίαν ἠξίουν λαμβάνειν, ἦ που τὸν ἔργῳ παραδόντα τὴν 
πόλιν ὑποχείριον τοῖς πολεμίοις οὐ μεγάλαις ἂν ζημίαις, ἐκόλασαν;’).57 
Κάλλιστον not only applies to the paradigm presented by the orator, but also to 
the deeds as illustrated in the passage quoted above (102) and the rant against 
those who dare to compare Leocrates’ flight with the departure of the heroes of 
Salamis: ‘This man is so foolish and holds you in such complete contempt that he 
thinks it right to compare the noblest of deeds with the most shameful.’ (‘καὶ 
οὕτως ἐστὶν ἀνόητος καὶ παντάπασιν ὑμῶν καταπεφρονηκώς, ὥστε τὸ 
κάλλιστον τῶν ἔργων πρὸς τὸ αἴσχιστον συμβαλεῖν ἠξίωσε.’ 68). Not only 
do the noblest deeds translate directly into the noblest paradigms praised in 
oratory, but by provoking great actions the paradigms further blur the boundary 
between word and deed: ‘choosing the noblest of actions’ (‘τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν 
ἔργων ἐκλεξάμενοι’), the poets ‘convince the people with word and presentation’ 
(‘μετὰ λόγου καὶ ἀποδείξεως τοὺς ἀνθρώπους συμπείθουσιν’, 102) and 
inversely the ancestors, ‘hearing these words’ (‘τούτων τῶν ἐπῶν ἀκούοντες’), 
‘are eager to imitate such deeds’ (‘τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἔργων ζηλοῦντες’, 104). 
This destabilization of the logos-ergon dichotomy is crucial to the presence of the 
past for which I have argued. When the mimesis of past deeds in poetry and 
oratory triggers their imitation by new deeds, then the past does not pass, but 
continues to live in the dialectic of logos and ergon. 
These observations may help to explain the massive deployment of the 
distant past in Against Leocrates that jars with the general preference for recent 
exempla in forensic and symbouleutic speeches. Not all ancient deeds marshalled 
by Lycurgus feature in the epitaphioi logoi – Codrus, for example, is a noteworthy 
absence – but others such as the Persian Wars do. More importantly, Lycurgus’ 
attitude toward the past is strongly reminiscent of the epideictic take on history.
58
 
The notion of tradition aligns Against Leocrates with the funeral speeches, which 
sketch Athenian history as a continuum of virtuous deeds stretching from the past 
to the present. As I have argued elsewhere, the funeral speeches also present 
themselves as part of the dialectic between logos and ergon that is the engine of 
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 See also 116; 123; 127 and for other uses of the logos-ergon dichotomy 29; 102. 
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Athens’ glorious history.59 The manner in which this view of the past is used 
rhetorically differs however in epitaphioi logoi and Against Leocrates. The 
former, glorifying the war dead, use it to compensate the individual experience of 
contingency with the unbroken continuum of the polis; the latter deploys it to 
chastise Leocrates. That being said, at a deeper level both are aligned in their 
admonition of the audience to keep the flag of Athens’ virtue flying. Lycurgus 
shares, as we have seen, the scepticism about the ancient past pervading forensic 
and symbouleutic oratory, but, following the practice of epideictic oratory, he 
turns to it to find edifying exempla that suit the needs of the present. While of 
lesser value for other argumentative needs, the larger-than-life frame of the 
ancient past lent itself to providing paradigms of exemplary conduct.
60
 
 
V. CHALLENGING THE VALUE OF THE PAST IN ANCIENT GREECE 
AND TODAY 
 
Myth, endowed with much authority in the symposium and at festivals and 
predominant in poetic genres, was less popular in oratory. As we have seen, 
mythical exempla were used to buttress diplomatic claims and myth was well-
suited to enchant the audiences of epideictic performances, but the assembly and 
the courtroom showed in general a preference for the recent past. At first sight, 
this reticence on myth as well as distant history is reminiscent of the modern 
disregard for the topos of historia magistra vitae. It is not incidental that Ford 
refers to ancient Greece to support his assertion that ‘history is bunk’. If our 
attempts to learn from history are not limited to contributing to the formation of 
our identities and to enhancing our understanding of the world in general,
61
 but 
dare to evoke specific events as foils to the present, then we tend to concentrate on 
recent events. A case in point is the infamous Chequers affair in 1990. Margaret 
Thatcher had invited the country’s big shot historians to discuss what history 
could teach about Germany and the character of its people.
62
 When the minutes of 
the meeting was leaked to the press, several less than favourable comments on the 
German national character caused a scandal. Concerning history, the discussion 
foregrounded recent events, notably the Third Reich and the decades after it. It is 
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 Cf. Grethlein 2010: 117-21; 123-5. 
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 In this context, it is worth noting the tendency to elaborate on the deeds of honorandi in 
honorary decrees of the Lycurgean era, cf. Rosen 1987 and Lambert 2011, who observes ‘a 
particularly heightened sense of the need for a paideutic engagement with the past and the capacity 
of inscriptions, particularly (though not only) inscriptions placed on the acropolis, to contribute to 
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 For a survey of such toned down versions of the topos of historia magistra vitae, see Kocka 
2005. It is however important to note that the early modern age already saw a surge of scepticism 
about exemplary uses of the past, see Burke 2011. For some further philosophical reflections on 
the fate of the topos historia magistra vitae in the modern age, see Bubner 2000.  
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 For the minutes of the meeting published in Der Spiegel of July 16, 1990, see Wengst 1992: 
122-8. For comments of the participants of the meeting, see Craig 1990; Ash 1992; Stone 1992; 
Stern 1992. 
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emblematic that the ‘Reichsgründung’ in 1871, but no other potential parallels 
from early modern or even medieval Germany were discussed as foils to the 
current process of German re-unification that caused the British Prime Minister so 
much discomfort.
63
 
And yet, the modern reluctance to derive lessons from the past, especially 
distant times, is distinct from the tendency of ancient orators to privilege recent 
exempla.
64
 A quotation from Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der 
Geschichte illustrates that it is rooted in a different concept of history: ‘Rulers, 
statesmen and nations are often advised to learn the lesson of historical 
experience. But what experience and history teach is this – that nations and 
governments have never learned anything from history or acted upon any lessons 
they might have drawn from it. Each age and each nation finds itself in such 
peculiar circumstances, in such a unique situation, that it can and must make 
decisions with reference to itself alone (and only the great individual can decide 
what the right course is). Amid the pressure of great events, a general principle is 
of no help, and it is not enough to look back on similar situations [in the past]; for 
pale recollections are powerless before the stress of the moment, and impotent 
before the life and freedom of the present.’65  
The distance of the mythical age and the fifth century BCE was one of the 
reasons that prompted fourth-century orators to favour exempla from 
contemporary history, but the modern emphasis on the individual character of  
each age strikes a different chord. For the ancient orators, temporal proximity 
heightened the persuasiveness of their exempla just as exempla from their own 
history were felt to be more compelling than those from alien poleis. The modern 
reservations against learning from the past are more profound. Beginning with 
Enlightenment historiography and then reinforced by the movement of 
Historicism, history started to be conceptualized as a unified process with a 
dynamic of its own.
66
 This ‘temporalization of history’ created a strong awareness 
of the individual character of ages that undermined the value of juxtaposition of 
events across ages. The qualitative difference between past and present that makes 
the moderns question the didactic function of history is far more unsettling than 
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 Cf. Craig 1991: 620. 
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 For the following, see also Grethlein 2010: 281-90. In Grethlein 2011, I compare the ambiguity 
of exempla in Herodotus and Thucydides with the modern scepticism about lessons to be learnt 
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 Hegel 1970 [1837]: 17: ‘Man verweist Regenten, Staatsmänner, Völker vornehmlich an die 
Belehrung durch die Erfahrung der Geschichte. Was die Erfahrung aber und die Geschichte lehren, 
ist dieses, dass Völker niemals etwas aus der Geschichte gelernt und nach Lehren, die aus 
derselben zu ziehen gewesen wären, gehandelt haben. Jede Zeit hat so eigentümliche Umstände, 
ist ein so individueller Zustand, dass in ihm aus ihm selbst entschieden werden muss und allein 
entschieden werden kann. Im Gedränge der Weltbegebenheiten hilft nicht ein allgemeiner 
Grundsatz, nicht das Erinnern an ähnliche Verhältnisse, denn so etwas wie eine fahle Erinnerung 
hat keine Kraft gegen die Lebendigkeit und Freiheit der Gegenwart.’ Translation from Nisbet 
1975: 21. 
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 See especially Koselleck 1979: 17-37. 
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the pre-eminently quantitative difference that led ancient orators to search for 
recent instead of ancient exempla. 
Certainly the notion of progress was not unknown in classical Greece
67
 
and the play with heroic and contemporary codes in some tragedies attests a 
feeling for the gap that separates the present from the mythical era.
68
 Just think of 
the Sophoclean Philoctetes: clashing with Odysseus’ utilitarian ethics that smacks 
of the ideas of the contemporary sophists, Philoctetes’ heroic values appear not 
only overtly rigorous, but may also seem dated, if not anachronistic. That being 
said, as Christian Meier demonstrated, the notions of change and improvement 
thriving especially in the fifth century BCE did not amount in any way to 
something similar to modern concepts of progress.
69
 Linked to changes 
experienced and rarely encompassing such crucial areas as ethics, society and 
economy, the ancient ‘Könnens-Bewußtsein’ did not produce an abstract and all-
embracing concept of progress that would extend to the future. Accordingly, no 
term emerged that, equivalent to our ‘history’, would have signified res gestae as 
a single inherently dynamic process.
70
 The observation of changes did not 
challenge the plausibility of exemplary history as the example of Thucydides 
demonstrates: in his Archaeology, he astutely notes the differences between 
archaic and contemporary Greeks, paying heed to customs and infrastructure. 
Nevertheless he does not shy away from paralleling the heroic expedition to Troy 
with the Peloponnesian War.
71
 What is more, referring to the ἀνθρώπινον, he 
programmatically announces his conviction that his account can impart precious 
lessons to future generations (1.22.4).
72
 
How far does this thesis about different attitudes to past and present 
extend? While trying to do justice to the variety of attitudes in different genres, I 
have focused on texts of the Classical Era. Subsequent times, however, saw 
profound changes. Recent work has started to explore in particular the 
complexities of the references to the Classical past that are so pervasive in 
Imperial literature.
73
 One of the points noted is an increasing awareness of the gap 
separating the present from the past. And yet, the often playful, sometimes 
subversive engagement with the classical past notwithstanding, it retained, even 
heightened its force as model for the present. That the difference between ancient 
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 See, e.g., Edelstein 1967; Dodds 1973; Meier 1980: 186-221. D’Angour 2011 produces much 
rhetorical self-fashioning, but little that is new. 
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 See Neumann 1995 on Euripides and Altmeyer 2001 on Sophocles. 
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 Meier 1980: 435-99. 
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 Meier assumes that the Greek notion of time was too weak to generate the idea of history as a 
directional process. The opposite is true, I think. It is the force of time, especially in the form of 
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2010: 287 and, more extensively on the example of Homer, 2006: 97-106. 
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 Cf. Kallet 2001: 97-112. 
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 Cf. Grethlein 2010: 268-79. 
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 For the prominence of the past in Imperial literature and culture, see Bowie 1970; Swain 1996: 
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and modern uses of exempla for which I have argued also applies at least to some 
Imperial authors is illustrated by a passage taken from Plutarch’s Precepts of 
Statecraft (814a):  
 
… the officials in the cities, when they foolishly urge the people to imitate 
the deeds, ideals, and actions of their ancestors, however unsuitable they 
may be to present times and conditions, stir up the common folk and, 
though what they do is laughable, what is done to them is no laughing 
matter, unless they are merely treated with utter contempt.  
… οἱ δ᾽ ἄρχοντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀνοήτως τὰ τῶν προγόνων ἔργα 
καὶ φρονήματα καὶ πράξεις ἀσυμμέτρους τοῖς παροῦσι καιροῖς καὶ 
πράγμασιν οὔσας μιμεῖσθαι κελεύοντες ἐξαίρουσι τὰ πλήθη, γελοῖά τε 
ποιοῦντες οὐκέτι γέλωτος ἄξια πάσχουσιν, ἂν μὴ πάνυ 
καταφρονηθῶσι. 
 
The critique of exempla that are ‘unsuitable to present times and 
conditions’ seems to anticipate the modern awareness of the autonomy of 
historical epochs, but Plutarch goes on (814a-b):  
 
Indeed there are many acts of the Greeks of former times by which the 
statesman can recount to mould and correct the characters of our 
contemporaries, for example, at Athens by calling to mind, not deeds in 
war, but such things as the decree of amnesty after the downfall of the 
Thirty Tyrants … 
πολλὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλα τῶν πρότερον Ἑλλήνων διεξιόντα τοῖς νῦν 
ἠθοποιεῖν καὶ σωφρονίζειν, ὡς Ἀθήνησιν ὑπομιμνήσκοντα μὴ τῶν 
πολεμικῶν, ἀλλ᾽ οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ψήφισμα τὸ τῆς ἀμνηστίας ἐπὶ τοῖς 
τριάκοντα. 
 
 Further instances from the fifth and fourth centuries BCE follow. Far from 
questioning the logic of an exemplary use of the past, Plutarch takes issue with the 
character of some exempla that ‘make the common folk vainly to swell with pride 
and kick up their heels’ (‘οἰδεῖν ποιεῖ καὶ φρυάττεσθαι διακενῆς τοὺς πολλούς’, 
814c). Despite the feeling of decadence and a stronger awareness of differences 
between past and present in the Imperial Age, the Classical Era did not cease to 
serve as a rich source of paradigms in a way that is hard to think of in the Modern 
Age. 
Three points may help to illustrate how the gravitational centre of ancient 
attitudes toward the past differs from ours. The first is iconography: by and large, 
ancient artists used the same iconographic typology for distant and recent history. 
Making a strong case against the assumption that the Boeotian shield serves as a 
marker of heroic action, Luca Giuliani concludes: ‘Archaic vase painting does not 
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then, include temporal indicators. When, as is so often the case, two fully armed 
warriors face each other with raised spears, there is nothing in this scene which 
would force or justify the observer to relate it to a duel between two mythical 
heroes of the distant past or to a fight in the present. Past and present are not 
distinguished.’74 Accordingly, in some cases, scholars do not agree on whether 
ancient paintings depict mythical or contemporary scenes.
75
 The application of the 
same iconography to myth and contemporary history betrays an attitude for which 
qualitative differences between historical epochs do not play a major role. 
The same discrepancy between modern and ancient Greek concepts of 
history comes to the fore in the attitude towards old buildings in the Archaic and 
Classical Ages. The modern emphasis on the specific character of historical 
epochs provided the ground for an increasing wish to conserve historical edifices. 
As Lowenthal notes, the modern historical consciousness ‘heightened concern to 
save relics and restore monuments as emblems of communal identity, continuity, 
and aspiration … Only in the nineteenth century CE did preservation evolve from 
an antiquarian, quirky, episodic pursuit into a set of national programmes …’76 In 
ancient Greece, on the other hand, there are only very few signs of deliberate 
restoration before the Hellenistic age.
77
 While taking a strong interest in the past, 
ancient Greeks, especially those of the Archaic and Classical Ages, did not 
foreground its otherness that is crucial for the idea of conservation.  
The arguably most salient expression of the modern take on history is the 
museum. Having its roots in aristocratic collections of the ancien régime, the idea 
of the museum was essentially shaped under the auspices of nineteenth-century 
Historicism.
78
 There were collections of old items in archaic and classical Greece 
too, most notably in temples, but they do not constitute museums in our sense.
79
 
While our exhibitions introduce the visitor to a world different from hers, temple 
collections were inextricably linked with the legitimizing needs of the present.
80
 
Showing how the Lindian Chronicle served to embed Lindus in important 
traditions, Robin Osborne notes: ‘These dedications are spoils from the past, 
appropriating both epic and history, not to commemorate past deeds by others, but 
                                                 
74
 Giuliani 2010: 49. 
75
 Cf. Grethlein 2010: 285-6. 
76
 Lowenthal 1985: xvi-xvii. On the idea of restoration and the modern age, see, for example, 
Althöfer 1987; Wagner 1988. 
77
 Cf. Dally (forthcoming). It was, however, common practice to reuse material from older temples 
in Greek sanctuaries, cf. Miles 2011: 670-2. 
78
 See, for example, Sheehan 2000. 
79
 For a diachronic overview of practises of collecting from antiquity to the present, see Pearce 
1995. It seems that the in the Hellenistic and the Imperial Ages collections became much more 
similar to our idea of the museum, cf. Bounia 2004: 19. See also Rutledge 2012 on ‘ancient Rome 
as a museum’ and Miles 2008 on ‘art as plunder’.  
80
 Needless to say, modern museums also generate some kind of cultural capital, in the nineteenth 
century CE in particular for the bourgeoisie (for a Foucaultian approach to the ‘birth of the 
museum’, see Bennett 1995), but their primary or at least their professed intention is the exhibition 
of objects as representations of the past.  
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to show off Lindos’ present pre-eminence.’81 Modern museums as well as 
restoration programmes are at least partly motivated by the sense of a rupture that 
separates the present from the past. The little prominence of both in archaic and 
classical Greece bespeaks the approach to the past that we have noticed in 
Lycurgus’ speech against Leocrates: here, the past is still present in the form of 
tradition. Needless to say, there is a strong concern with traditions in our days that 
prompted Lowenthal to speak of a heritage crusade.
82
 Inversely, ancient Greeks 
could highlight the gap that separated them from the past; as we have seen, the 
Attic orators were at pains to find exempla close to the here and now. These and 
further qualifications notwithstanding, modern and ancient ideas of history are 
balanced differently. To the Greeks, the past was far less of a foreign country. The 
orators’ preference for recent exempla not only co-exists with the prominence of 
myth in festivals and symposium, but also has roots different from the modern 
unease with ancient exempla. 
 
 
Notes:  
 
Clarke 2008: 251: emphasis on recent past unlike in local historians with 
penchant for remote past 
- Clarke 2008: 257, 279f.: Dem., de falsa leg. 16, 307: chastising 
Aeschines for tendency to forget ancestors  
- Clarke 2008: 251: private speeches nearly devoid of historical references 
- Isocr. 4,8: casting recent past in mythical mould 
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